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The question of what government should control exclusively and what it 
should delegate to private entities is as old as government itself. In ancient 
Greece, ownership of forests and mines rested with the government, but the 
government “contracted out the work to individuals and firms.”1 And in 
ancient Rome, the private sector “fulfilled virtually all of the state’s economic 
requirements,” like tax collection, supplying the army, and feeding the sacred 
geese of the Capitol.2 Though privatization is nothing new,3 it’s becoming an 
increasingly important issue as government gets bigger and its functions 
multiply. As the pressure to privatize increases, we must be mindful of its 
advantages and pitfalls. 
Privatization comes in two basic flavors.4 First is the shift in the production 
of goods and services from the government to the private sector,5 such as 
privatizing Amtrak or the Tennessee Valley Authority. This process belongs to 
the world of law and economics6 and won’t be addressed here, except to say 
 
 * Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
 ** Mr. Bentz is a former law clerk to the Honorable Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit (2012–2013) and is currently an associate at the Washington, D.C. law firm of Kellogg, 
Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C. The views expressed in this Article do not reflect or represent 
the views of the law firm. 
 1 William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, History and Methods of Privatization, in INT’L HANDBOOK 
ON PRIVATIZATION 25, 25 (David Parker & David Saal eds., 2003). 
 2 ROBERT SOBEL, THE PURSUIT OF WEALTH: THE INCREDIBLE STORY OF MONEY THROUGHOUT THE 
AGES 21 (2000); see PLUTARCHUS, THE ROMAN QUESTIONS OF PLUTARCH 161 (H. J. Rose ed. & trans., Arno 
Press 1975) (1924).  
 3 See Germà Bel, Retrospectives: The Coining of “Privatization” and Germany’s National Socialist 
Party, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 187, 187, 189–91 (2006) (documenting that the term “privatization” goes back to the 
1930s). 
 4 Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6, 13–14 (1988). 
 5 See id. at 14. 
 6 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135 (1998) 
(explaining that “advances in the theories of ownership and contracting have reopened the question of state 
versus private provision”). 
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that privatization of production is generally a good thing. Moving in the 
opposite direction—toward communism—doesn’t work. 
This Article will focus on the second flavor of privatization, meaning the 
shift of government functions to private control.7 
As you likely know, privatization offers many benefits. When combined 
with competition, it can improve efficiency and lower costs.8 FedEx and UPS 
compete with each other and drive down prices, while still turning a profit.9 
Contrast that with the U.S. Postal Service, which loses billions of dollars a 
year.10 
Privatization also leads to specialization. In fact, the modern administrative 
state is built on the idea that the government needs agencies to specialize.11 For 
example, areas like medicine and air quality are beyond Congress’s ability to 
manage directly, so it established the FDA and the EPA. And sometimes, the 
experts needed to work in these agencies are easier to find—or at least easier to 
motivate using market incentives—in the private sector. Thus, by privatizing 
certain government functions, we can allow private companies with specialized 
expertise to run them. 
When you combine competition and specialization, you get efficiency. 
Efficiency isn’t something you can usually count on in government because the 
incentives are misaligned.12 If you’re the government and your costs increase, 
you can just raise taxes. But if you’re a private company, you have to figure 
out how to reduce costs or increase revenue, or you’ll go bankrupt. 
These benefits mean that privatization of many government functions is not 
at all controversial. Nobody minds if Atlanta hires a private construction firm 
to build a city office building. And we don’t complain when janitorial services 
at federal buildings are performed by private contractors rather than 
government employees. But what about privatizing core government 
functions? 
 
 7 Starr, supra note 4, at 14.  
 8 See Shleifer, supra note 6, at 138–39. 
 9 See Suzanne McGee, UPS vs. FedEx: Two Plays on (Eventual) Global Recovery—Only One That’s 
Low-Priced, FORBES (Oct. 31, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ycharts/2012/10/31/ups-vs-
fedex-two-plays-on-eventual-global-recovery-only-one-thats-low-priced/. 
 10 Ron Nixon, Postal Service Reports Loss of $15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A22. 
 11 See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 654 (1973). 
 12 But see law clerks to Chief Judge Kozinski. 
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Public institutions are public for a reason. Sometimes, it’s because of the 
tragedy of the commons.13 We all need clean air and feel that the governing 
rules should be written with public input and enforced by a politically 
accountable entity, so we established the EPA. Sometimes, it’s a collective 
action problem.14 We all need national defense and want to ensure that military 
power is used at the direction of our elected, civilian commanders, so we 
formed a public military. And sometimes, it’s a moral sensibility. We want to 
deter crime and punish criminals, but we don’t want victims to exact private 
retribution. 
Privatizing such core government functions can give us some gains in 
efficiency, but we risk forfeiting the benefits of the institutions’ public 
character—in particular, equality and accountability.15 This Article will focus 
on areas where the pressure to privatize and the challenges to equality and 
accountability are most acute—education, prisons, the military, and the justice 
system. By focusing on each of these in turn, we hope to highlight some of the 
pitfalls of privatization and suggest some ways to avoid them. 
I. EDUCATION 
First, education. The most direct route to privatization is through vouchers. 
Voucher programs allow parents to send their kids to private schools with 
taxpayer money.16 The most famous advocate of school vouchers, Nobel 
laureate Milton Friedman, argued that giving parents the option to choose their 
children’s school would create free-market competition.17 “For Friedman and 
those who follow[] him, the school voucher is a straightforward application of 
first-year college economics to ameliorating poor school quality.”18 
 
 13 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (explaining that 
individuals, acting independently and rationally, will deplete a shared resource, despite their understanding 
that depleting the common resource is contrary to the group’s long-term interests). 
 14 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 13–15 (1971) (noting that government services “must be available to everyone if they are available to 
anyone” because it is not feasible “to deny [such services] to those who did not voluntarily pay their share of 
the costs of government, and taxation is accordingly necessary”).  
 15 See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee–Contractor Distinction, 46 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 133, 147–48 (2012) (discussing the argument that “contracting out for prison management, 
military services, or other functions violates core commitments of public law”).  
 16 See Klint Alexander & Kern Alexander, Vouchers and the Privatization of American Education: 
Justifying Racial Resegregation from Brown to Zelman, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1132. 
 17 Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909, 
941 (2007). 
 18 Id. 
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When you have a single school district, there’s often little competition 
driving the public school to provide children with a better education.19 
Opening up the market leads to competition among schools for funding, which 
can lead to good results. It can drive down costs. For example, the Milwaukee 
voucher system saved Wisconsin over fifty million dollars in 2011 alone.20 
Voucher systems can also help kids. In Milwaukee, voucher students were 
more likely to graduate from high school than their public-school 
counterparts.21 And pupils who remain in public schools can benefit too. Even 
though it undoubtedly drove some strong students to private schools, the 
introduction of vouchers in Milwaukee is credited with driving up test scores 
in public schools.22 Similarly, a study on the Florida voucher program found 
that public schools facing pressure from voucher programs opted to change the 
way they taught.23 They increased instructional time and teacher resources and 
began targeting high-needs children.24 However, “once the threat of vouchers 
goes away, so does the incentive for failing schools to improve.”25 
But privatization can also undermine the advantages of public education. 
The main reason we’ve committed to public education is to equalize access, 
and we’ve spent decades trying to achieve it. When communities turn to 
voucher programs, they must be mindful of the disparate effect these programs 
can have on poor families.26 If private schools can charge more than the 
voucher is worth, poor families still face a barrier to entry. The vouchers may 
not be enough to pay for any private school that’s better than the public school 
 
 19 See id. (recognizing that monopolies hurt consumers while competitive markets “harness consumer 
sovereignty to improve products for everyone”). 
 20 PATRICK J. WOLF, THE COMPREHENSIVE LONGITUDINAL EVALUATION OF THE MILWAUKEE PARENTAL 
CHOICE PROGRAM: SUMMARY OF FINAL REPORTS 5 (2012), available at http://www.uark.edu/ua/der/SCDP/ 
Milwaukee_Eval/Report_36.pdf. 
 21 JOHN ROBERT WARREN, GRADUATION RATES FOR CHOICE AND PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS IN 
MILWAUKEE, 2003–2009, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.schoolchoicewi.org/files/1613/6018/6466/2011-
Grad-Study-FINAL3.pdf. 
 22 Rajashri Chakrabarti, Can Increasing Private School Participation and Monetary Loss in a Voucher 
Program Affect Public School Performance? Evidence from Milwaukee, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1371, 1372 (2008). 
 23 Cecilia Elena Rouse et al., Feeling the Florida Heat? How Low-Performing Schools Respond to 
Voucher and Accountability Pressure 4–5 (Nat’l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 13, 2007). 
 24 Id. at 5. 
 25 Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, When Schools Compete: The Effects of Vouchers on Florida 
Public School Achievement, at Executive Summary (Ctr. for Civic Innovation, Working Paper No. 2, 2003). 
 26 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, School Vouchers, Thomas Jefferson, Roger Williams, and Protecting the 
Faithful: Warnings from the Eighteenth Century and the Seventeenth Century on the Danger of Establishments 
to Religious Communities, 2008 BYU L. REV. 525, 527. 
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they’d be leaving.27 Moreover, if private schools are siphoning money from 
public schools, they may leave the kids stuck in public schools far worse off.28 
How do we fix this? One solution is to limit the amount schools can charge 
on top of vouchers. The Ohio voucher program approved by the Supreme 
Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris required that schools not charge the lowest 
income families more than $250 over the voucher amount.29 Or we could 
require schools to accept a certain percentage of students for the cost of the 
voucher, perhaps based on need. Or, if we really wanted to level the playing 
field, we could give out vouchers only to the truly needy.30 
One other obvious concern with privatizing education is that it increases 
the state’s involvement with religious schools. It’s true that a lot of voucher 
money goes to religious schools. In Zelman, for example, ninety-six percent of 
voucher students enrolled in religiously affiliated schools.31 Because money is 
fungible, any funds paid by the government to help run a religious school 
release an equal amount to support the school’s religious mission. 
But what’s more interesting is the flip-side of the religious concern–
accountability. The state may lose a fair amount of control when schools are 
privatized. One major cause of this is the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
the Establishment Clause: If the government starts messing around with 
religious schools too much, it might violate the third prong of the Court’s 
Lemon test.32 So states have to be somewhat hands-off when it comes to 
private schools. This lack of accountability may strike some as problematic, as 
it may result in students in private schools getting an inferior secular education 
compared to those in public schools. 
In fact, the Florida Supreme Court struck down a voucher program largely 
because of the lack of accountability.33 The court held that the voucher 
 
 27 Id. at 535. 
 28 Id. at 527 (“Vouchers put the poorest and least-able families at risk because, in the end, vouchers will 
undermine educational quality in the public schools that those individuals with the fewest resources will still 
be attending.”). 
 29 536 U.S. 639, 646 (2002). 
 30 See id. (recognizing that the vouchers were given based on financial need). 
 31 Id. at 647. 
 32 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13, 615 (1971) (explaining that a statute violates the 
Establishment Clause if it fosters “an excessive government entanglement with religion” (quoting Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 33 See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 409–10 (Fla. 2006). 
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program violated article IX of the Florida Constitution,34 which requires the 
legislature to provide a public school system that is “uniform.”35 The court 
found that the voucher program allowed Florida to give money to private 
schools that were “not subject to the same standards as those in force in public 
schools.”36 And since article IX has been interpreted to require “uniform 
operation throughout the State,” the diversion of money to private schools was 
deemed to be unconstitutional.37 
There’s no reason to debate Florida constitutional law here, but how much 
of a problem is this in practice? Schools, after all, are accountable to 
customers—the parents who send their children there.38 We trust parents to 
make all sorts of decisions regarding the welfare of children, and parents are 
generally pretty good at it. If parents are unhappy with their children’s 
education at one school, they’ll pull them out and send them elsewhere. If 
parents are happy with the school, they’ll keep their kids enrolled, and the 
school will continue to get money. This system allows parents to hold schools 
directly accountable.39 
II. PRISONS 
But there are other kinds of institutions, where there are no customers, or at 
least no customers who can exercise choice. Prison—where the kids who 
didn’t get a voucher end up—is a good example. We’ve had some form of 
private prisons in America since our founding.40 But today, private prison 
populations are ballooning. More than 100,000 convicts are in prisons run by 
private companies.41 And from 1999 to 2010, the number of federal prisoners 
in private custody increased by 784%.42 
 
 34 Id.  
 35 FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 409. 
 36 Holmes, 919 So. 2d at 409. 
 37 Id. at 405, 412–13 (quoting State ex rel. Clark v. Henderson, 188 So. 351, 352 (Fla. 1939)). 
 38 See James Forman, Jr., The Rise and Fall of School Vouchers: A Story of Religion, Race, and Politics, 
54 UCLA L. REV. 547, 600 (2007). 
 39 See Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 476 (Wis. 1992).  
 40 CODY MASON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE: PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA 1 
(2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be_True.pdf. 
 41 Id.; see also PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. NO. NCJ 
236096, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 30 app. tbl.19 (2011), available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf 
(revised Feb. 9, 2012).  
 42 MASON, supra note 40, at 1. 
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So we’re certainly on the way to prison privatization. But private prisons 
present a troubling accountability problem. This was illustrated by the private 
prison near Kingman, Arizona. Back in 2010, two convicted murderers 
escaped from the privately run prison and murdered a couple taking a camping 
trip.43 It turns out the private prison was being run like a “day care,” with a 
broken alarm system and a lax security culture.44 
These problems are likely the result of a lack of accountability. The lack of 
state control of private schools isn’t such a serious problem because the private 
schools serve customers who can take their business elsewhere. But with 
prisons, we don’t have that same mechanism. The only real check on private 
prisons is when the prison renegotiates its contract with the state.45 
Professor Sasha Volokh has suggested that a prison voucher system might 
introduce the same sorts of benefits we see with school vouchers.46 If prisoners 
could choose where they served their time, prisons would compete for 
money.47 According to Professor Volokh, that could increase security, improve 
the quality of health care, and offer more forms of rehabilitation.48 
But prisoners are not the only constituents served by prisons. In fact, one 
might more accurately call prisoners anti-customers. The real customers are the 
people on the outside who will suffer the detriments of poor prison 
administration.49 Treating prisoners as the customers undermines the purpose 
of punishment.50 An important aspect of punishment is loss of control. If 
you’re in prison, you’re no longer allowed to eat when you want, go to sleep 
and wake up when you want, watch TV when you want, have sex and visit 
 
 43 JJ Hensley, Family of Couple Killed by Arizona Inmates Files Lawsuit Against State, ARIZ. REPUBLIC 
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/20110318arizona-inmates-kill-
couple-lawsuit.html.  
 44 Id.; see also Bob Ortega, Arizona Prison Oversight Lacking for Private Facilities: State Weighs 
Expansion Even as Costs Run High, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/ 
20110807arizona-prison-private-oversight.html.  
 45 See Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779, 822 (2012) (noting that if prisoners 
can transfer out, “[o]nce a private provider gets a prison contract, if reputational and contract-renewal concerns 
are weak, there are strong incentives to reduce quality”). 
 46 Id. at 784. Professor Volokh recognizes that there would be costs to a voucher system. Id. at 862–63. 
His article “is meant to spur further research and debate on the question, not to come down on one side or 
another.” Id. at 792. 
 47 See id. at 790 (hypothesizing that a prisoner voucher system would move prison administrators, “as if 
by an invisible hand, to make their prisons better places”). 
 48 Id. at 796, 798–99. 
 49 See id. at 784–85. 
 50 See id. at 792. 
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with family when you want. Your life is—to a great degree—controlled for 
you. Prison vouchers ameliorate and undermine punishment by giving 
prisoners some control over their lives. The prisoner now gets to choose where 
he serves his time and under what conditions, making the sentence easier to 
bear.51 
And when it comes to accountability, prison vouchers cater to the wrong 
customer.52 If prisons compete for funding based on what prisoners prefer, 
prisons will start offering amenities that may be inconsistent with the goals of 
punishment and security.53 Just imagine: “Come to Paradise Prison! We’ve got 
the hottest showers in town, bed checks only every other week, and free WiFi 
access at every bunk.” 
Still, prisons do have important responsibilities to prisoners, and private 
prisons do need to be held accountable if they fail to fulfill those duties. Civil 
liability is one route.54 And until recently, that seemed like an effective tool for 
holding private individuals doing government work accountable.55 But last 
term, the Supreme Court told us that’s not always possible because of the 
doctrine of qualified immunity.56 
The case was Filarsky v. Delia.57 Nicholas Delia was a firefighter who got 
sick when he responded to a toxic spill. He stayed home to rest, or at least 
that’s what he told the city. While he was supposedly at home, Delia was 
spotted buying building supplies. The city launched an investigation to see if 
Delia was actually sick or just taking time off at government expense to 
remodel his house. The city engaged an employment lawyer, Steve Filarsky, to 
help with the investigation. While he was interviewing Delia, Filarsky ordered 
him to produce the construction materials, the theory being that if Delia were 
 
 51 According to Professor Volokh, “nothing in this proposal requires treating prisoners as morally entitled 
to choose.” Id. at 828. But whatever the motivations for allowing prisoners to choose, the end result is that 
prisoners gain more control over their lives and may exercise preferences. The concern isn’t why we allow 
prisoners to choose, but that the choice itself is incompatible with the purpose of prison. 
 52 See id. at 845–52 (“Solving the agency problem by allowing prisoners to choose may exacerbate these 
negative externalities.” (footnote omitted)). 
 53 See id. at 844. 
 54 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1997). 
 55 See Delia v. City of Rialto, 621 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a private attorney 
retained by a city was not shielded from civil suit), rev’d sub nom. Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012). 
 56 For general background on the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity cases, see generally Alexander 
Volokh, Supreme Court Clarifies Standards for Qualified Immunity in Civil Rights Cases—Or Does It?, 
REASON FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2013), http://reason.org/news/show/privatization-qualified-immunity. 
 57 132 S. Ct. 1657. 
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indeed sick, he wouldn’t have used any of the materials. Delia complied but 
later sued Filarsky under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Fourth 
Amendment rights.58 
It’s well established that government officials have qualified immunity, but 
Filarsky was a private citizen.59 Was he, too, immune from suit? When 
Filarsky came to the Ninth Circuit, we held that he had no immunity.60 But the 
Supreme Court, as it likes to do, reversed us, 9–0.61 
Now before you say, “Oh, that’s just the Ninth Circuit—it includes Stephen 
Reinhardt,” it’s important to know that the case wasn’t so cut and dried. A 
recent Supreme Court case involving a private prison, Richardson v. 
McKnight,62 seemed to require denying Filarsky immunity. There, the Supreme 
Court held that prison guards employed by a private firm were not entitled to 
qualified immunity under § 1983.63 Perhaps you can see why the Ninth Circuit 
came out the way it did in Filarsky. If the private actors in Richardson weren’t 
immune, then it would seem neither was Filarsky. 
But Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the full court, held that Filarsky was 
different.64 To show how, he went back to 1871—when Congress passed 
§ 1983.65 Back then, it would not have been unusual for a shopkeeper to serve 
as the postmaster or for a ferryman to collect fees as a public wharfmaster.66 In 
fact, private lawyers like Abraham Lincoln conducted criminal prosecutions.67 
Since private citizens were so involved in carrying out public functions, 
immunity didn’t depend on the defendant being a full-time government 
employee.68 According to the Chief Justice, Filarsky was a modern-day 
 
 58 Id. at 1661. 
 59 Id. at 1661–62. 
 60 Delia, 621 F.3d at 1081. 
 61 Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1659, 1668. 
 62 521 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1997); see also Delia, 621 F.3d at 1080 (declining to rely on a Sixth Circuit 
case which suggested that, in light of Richardson, private citizens may be entitled to qualified immunity); 
Gonzalez v. Spencer, 336 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that the private citizen defendant 
was not entitled to qualified immunity because “no special reasons significantly favor[ed] an extension of 
governmental immunity” (quoting Richardson, 521 U.S. at 412) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 63 Richardson, 521 U.S. at 401–02. 
 64 Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1659. 
 65 Id. at 1662–63. 
 66 Id. at 1663. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 1664. 
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Abraham Lincoln, contracted by the state to conduct an investigation.69 In fact, 
it’s a well-kept secret that Steven Spielberg’s next movie is called Filarsky. 
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded, Filarsky should be entitled to the same 
immunity as if he’d been a full-time city employee.70 This is clearly the right 
result, and not just because it was nine–zip. It just makes sense to extend 
immunity to those who do the government’s bidding. 
But what’s troubling about Filarsky is where it leaves Richardson, the 
prison guard case. It seems that Richardson was wrongly decided and should 
have been overturned in Filarsky. As Justice Scalia said in dissent in 
Richardson, the majority’s “holding is supported neither by common-law 
tradition nor public policy, and contradicts our settled practice of determining 
§ 1983 immunity on the basis of the public function being performed.”71 The 
right result in Richardson was to hold the prison guards immune from suit. But 
instead of overruling Richardson in Filarsky, Chief Justice Roberts attempted 
to cabin the Richardson decision, saying it involved private individuals 
employed by a private corporation.72 But those private individuals were still 
performing government functions at the behest of the government and being 
funded by taxpayer dollars. The tension between Filarsky and Richardson will 
likely cause no end of trouble. 
In any event, as far as Filarsky and Richardson are concerned, it doesn’t 
matter whether they’re immune or not. As long as they know the rule, they can 
build their contracts around it.73 Let’s say a company that contracts with 
Georgia to run a prison knows that it’s going to face lawsuits from prisoners—
some justified, some not. If the company isn’t immune, it will demand more 
money from the state to cover the cost of insuring against those lawsuits. If it’s 
immune, the company’s price will be lower. 
What this means is that by not providing immunity to the private prison 
guards, we’re passing that cost on to Georgia. In essence, we’re penalizing 
Georgia for privatizing, and this will diminish the efficiency gains from 
privatizing prisons. It also creates a curious inequality problem: prisoners who 
are housed in state-run prisons will face an immunity hurdle if they try to sue, 
 
 69 Id. at 1667. 
 70 Id. at 1667–68. 
 71 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 414 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 72 Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1667. 
 73 Cf. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960) (explaining that without an 
“initial delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine [those rights]”). 
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while those in privately run prisons will not. Thus, from the victim’s 
perspective, recompense will depend entirely on the prison’s public or private 
character. 
III.  MILITARY 
Another area where privatization creates difficult accountability problems 
is the military. Privatization of war is nothing new; mercenaries go back 
thousands of years.74 And in America, the private sector has often been 
contracted to supply the military.75 Nonetheless, we’ve seen a rapid increase in 
the use of private contractors during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.76 So it’s 
more important than ever to figure out how to keep them accountable. 
The Department of Defense maintains that “[c]ontractor personnel are 
civilians accompanying the U.S. Armed Forces.”77 In other words, they “are 
not part of the operational chain of command.”78 And a bipartisan 
congressional commission found that the reliance on contractors is 
“overwhelming the government’s ability to effectively manage and oversee 
contractors.”79 So if the military can’t manage them, who will? The 
commission suggested one possible route: The Department of Defense could 
require contractors to consent to U.S. civil jurisdiction as part of every 
contract.80 The problem with that approach is that jurisdiction means nothing if 
contractors can’t be held liable. 
And it seems that contractors are virtually never liable. To see why, we 
must go back half a century to Feres v. United States.81 In the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA), Congress waived the government’s sovereign immunity 
for certain tort claims.82 In Feres, a soldier (and some soldiers’ estates) tried to 
 
 74 Andrew Finkelman, Suing the Hired Guns: An Analysis of Two Federal Defenses to Tort Lawsuits 
Against Military Contractors, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 395, 399 (2009). 
 75 Karen L. Douglas, Contractors Accompanying the Force: Empowering Commanders with Emergency 
Change Authority, 55 A.F. L. REV. 127, 130 (2004). 
 76 Finkelman, supra note 74, at 399–400.  
 77 48 C.F.R. § 252.225–7040(b)(3) (2011). 
 78 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, REG. 715–19, OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT PLANNING AND 
MANAGEMENT ch.4-1(d) (20 June 2011). 
 79 COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN, TRANSFORMING WARTIME 
CONTRACTING: CONTROLLING COSTS, REDUCING RISKS 2 (2011). 
 80 Id. at 160. 
 81 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 82 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). 
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sue the United States under the FTCA.83 But the Supreme Court held that 
soldiers weren’t entitled to sue the government under the FTCA for injuries 
they suffered while on duty.84 This concept became known as the Feres 
doctrine.85 
But the Feres doctrine doesn’t bar suits against government contractors,86 
which means they could be sued under a number of laws, including the Alien 
Tort Statute87 and state tort law.88 Nonetheless, these claims are largely D.O.A. 
because of the military contractor defense the Supreme Court crafted in Boyle 
v. United Technologies Corp.89 Boyle died when his helicopter crashed off the 
coast of Virginia.90 While he survived the impact, he couldn’t get the escape 
hatch open and drowned.91 His father filed suit under Virginia state tort law 
against the contractor who built the helicopter, but the contractor claimed 
immunity because it was working for the U.S. military.92 
The Supreme Court explained that while the Feres doctrine immunized the 
United States from suits brought under the FTCA, it didn’t protect contractors 
from liability under other laws.93 Nonetheless, the FTCA played a prominent 
role in Boyle. Congress didn’t fully waive the United States’ sovereign 
immunity in passing the FTCA but instead preserved immunity for 
discretionary functions and combatant activities.94 
The Boyle Court explained that there is a “uniquely federal interest” in 
“civil liabilities arising out of the performance of federal procurement 
contracts.”95 There was also a significant conflict between state tort law and a 
 
 83 340 U.S. at 136–37. 
 84 Id. at 146. 
 85 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 687–88 (1987) (explaining that “the Feres doctrine 
has been applied consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members against the Government based upon 
service-related injuries”). 
 86 See, e.g., Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that 
the Feres doctrine was inapplicable because the defendant contractor was a “distinct entity” that could not be 
described as a government employee). 
 87 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 88 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988). 
 89 Id. at 501; see generally VIVIAN S. CHU & KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41755, TORT 
SUITS AGAINST FEDERAL CONTRACTORS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL ISSUES 12–15 (2011) (explaining the 
government contractor defense). 
 90 487 U.S. at 502. 
 91 Id. 
 92 See id. at 502–03. 
 93 See id. at 509–10. 
 94 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (j) (1982). 
 95 487 U.S. at 505–06 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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federal law, namely the discretionary functions exception to the FTCA.96 The 
Court held that “the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment 
to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function within the 
meaning of this provision.”97 Thus, the unique federal interest and the conflict 
between state and federal law meant that the state law was preempted, 
providing the contractor with a defense.98 
While Boyle dealt with a procurement contract,99 Boyle’s logic was 
extended to service contracts by the D.C. Circuit in Saleh v. Titan Corp.100 The 
contractors in that case provided interrogation services at the infamous Abu 
Ghraib prison.101 This, by the way, must be a great line on somebody’s résumé: 
2003–2004, Interrogation Services, Abu Ghraib, Iraq. There are probably many 
jobs where that credential will come in handy (mainly in New Jersey). 
In Saleh, several Iraqis asserted various tort claims against the 
contractors,102 but the D.C. Circuit held that the combatant activities exception 
served to preempt those claims because the contractors were “integrated into 
combatant activities over which the military retain[ed] command authority.”103 
Perhaps this is right: Contractors should be effectively immune in the vast 
majority of cases. Nevertheless, sovereign immunity is built on the assumption 
that the government is accountable to the people through the political 
process.104 Because military contractors aren’t accountable to the people, 
liability seems to be an appropriate tool for holding them accountable. No 
doubt what’s animating these decisions are the concerns expressed earlier, 
namely that the cost of liability borne by the contractor will inevitably be 
passed on to the government.105 If we hold contractors liable, we effectively 
 
 96 Id. at 511. 
 97 Id. 
 98 See id. at 511–13 (“[W]e are of the view that state law which holds Government contractors liable for 
design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances present a ‘significant conflict’ with federal 
policy and must be displaced.”). 
 99 Id. at 502, 505. 
 100 580 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 101 Id. at 2. 
 102 Id. at 2–3. 
 103 Id. at 9. 
 104 See Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV. 899, 900 
(2010) (“[F]ederal sovereign immunity fits comfortably with popular sovereignty, divided and diminished 
government power, and political accountability for public officers.”). 
 105 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988); Trevor Wilson, Comment, Operation 
Contractor Shield: Extending the Government Contractor Defense in Recognition of Modern Warfare 
Realities, 83 TUL. L. REV. 255, 273 (2008). 
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undermine the government’s immunity.106 And even though the Court has held 
contractors can’t sue the United States for indemnity,107 contractors can still 
build the cost of insurance into their contracts. 
IV.  JUSTICE 
One final area of privatization that illustrates problems of both inequality 
and accountability is the justice system. I’m sure you all know about 
alternative dispute resolution, or ADR. That’s where you and your opponent go 
(sometimes you’re ordered to go) to work out your problems with a mediator 
or arbitrator. Even if ADR is a foreign word to you, you’ve surely seen Judge 
Wapner or Judge Judy meting out justice on TV. 
ADR is often court-sanctioned. For example, in the Ninth Circuit we have a 
very successful mediation program.108 But you can also hire private companies 
to mediate your disputes.109 In California, you can actually have a private trial. 
For a fee, ADR Services, Inc. will give you a retired state judge, and the jury’s 
verdict will be “entered in the court as if the trial were conducted there.”110 
The benefits are obvious. First, the trial is private and can be kept 
private.111 For example, if Apple and Microsoft have a nasty dispute about 
software and don’t want the bad publicity that goes with a lawsuit, they can go 
have a private trial. Also, parties can handpick the judge.112 It might be useful 
to have someone who knows something about computers and technology 
presiding over the trial, rather than a random judge down at superior court.113 
In addition, cases are typically resolved faster through ADR. In Los 
Angeles, it usually takes more than a year to get to trial, which is still better 
 
 106 See supra text accompanying notes 70–73. 
 107 Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673–74 (1977). 
 108 Alex Kozinski, Mediation in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: A Message from 
the Chief Judge, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/mediation/ (last visited 
Dec. 11, 2013). 
 109 See ADR SERVICES, INC., http://www.adrservices.org (last visited Dec. 11, 2013); RESOL. REMEDIES, 
http://www.resolutionremedies.com (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). 
 110 Private Trials, ADR SERVICES, INC., http://www.adrservices.org/private-trials.php (last visited Dec. 
11, 2013). 
 111 Id. 
 112 The ADR Process—Private Trials, RESOL. REMEDIES, http://www.resolutionremedies.com/adr_ 
process/private-trials.asp (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). 
 113 Id. (“Some cases present complex legal and technical issues, and it will often serve the interests of all 
parties [to] have an arbitrator who has particular expertise in the area of law involved.”). 
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than what it used to be: five years.114 With court funding slashed because of 
budget shortfalls, the time to trial will inevitably increase.115 A private trial can 
happen as soon as the parties are ready.116 And here’s where the inequality 
comes in: Apple and Microsoft can afford to buy their way out of the justice 
system, but the average litigant can’t. 
Whether litigants should be able to do this is a tough question, but health 
care presents a useful analogy for consideration. In Canada, health care is 
delivered through a publicly funded health care system.117 Each province is 
responsible for financing and regulating a statewide health insurance 
program.118 Some provinces, including Quebec, made it illegal to buy private 
medical insurance, which meant that everyone had to use the same publicly 
funded services.119 Think of it like the transplant list here in the United States. 
If you need a heart, you have to wait your turn; you can’t buy one legally.120 
The prohibition on private health care in Quebec translated into long lines. 
As one doctor put it, while “dogs can get a hip replacement in under a 
week . . . humans can wait two to three years.”121 A few years ago, though, the 
Canadian Supreme Court struck down the prohibition for the province of 
Quebec.122 The bitterly divided court held that the long waits and inability to 
access private health insurance violated the Quebec Charter for Human Rights 
and Freedoms.123 
In America, we tend to favor money as the way to ration; other countries, 
like Canada, focus on equality.124 Both forms of rationing have their 
drawbacks. Rationing by money means the poor suffer. Indeed, if we ration 
based solely on money, poor people could be shut out entirely. 
 
 114 Kevin O’Leary, And Justice for Some: L.A.’s Shrinking Court System, TIME (Mar. 21, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1973909,00.html. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Cf. Christopher Baum, The Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest 
Development Disputes, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 907, 924 (2010) (recognizing that disputes in arbitration are 
resolved more quickly). 
 117 Raisa Berlin Deber, Health Care Reform: Lessons from Canada, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 20, 20 
(2003). 
 118 Id. at 21.  
 119 Chaoulli v. Québec (Att’y Gen.), [2005] S.C.R. 791, 805 (Can.). 
 120 See Amy Harmon, Auction for a Kidney Pops Up on Ebay’s Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A13. 
 121 Clifford Krauss, Canada’s Private Clinics Surge as Public System Falters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, 
at A3 (quoting Dr. Brian Day, president and medical director of the Cambie Surgery Centre).  
 122 Chaoulli, [2005] S.C.R. at 793, 842. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See Deber, supra note 117, at 21.  
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But rationing on the basis of strict equality means that the system misses 
out on the money that the rich would have paid into the system. Those dollars 
could be used for research or to provide free care for poor people. In addition, 
allowing the rich to buy their way out takes them out of the public line, 
meaning poor people move up in line. Then again, if too many people are able 
to buy their way out of the system, the system will lose its public support and 
funding, leaving less for those stuck in it. This is much the same problem as 
with school vouchers. 
It’s also the same challenge we face when we allow people to buy their way 
out of the judiciary. Rich people get justice faster, and perhaps better; poor 
people have to wait years to see their case go to trial. As we increase our 
reliance on ADR, we have to be mindful of who gets to use it, and whether it’s 
fair to those left behind. 
So far, we’ve been discussing only civil litigants, but you might be 
surprised to learn that criminals, too, can sometimes bypass the public court 
system. 
Last year at a KFF,125 we screened an Australian film called Face to 
Face.126 It follows the story of a guy who crashes into his boss’s car in a fit of 
anger, but instead of going through the criminal court system, he participates in 
something called restorative justice, where all the parties to the dispute are 
encouraged to work out their differences.127 We don’t want to give away what 
happens, but the movie provides an introduction to the concept. 
Now, you’re probably thinking: Of course Australia is soft on crime; the 
country was founded by criminals. The United States would never have a 
program like that. In fact, several U.S. cities, like Baltimore and Minneapolis, 
already have such programs.128 
So does restorative justice work? There’s not much data because there 
aren’t many programs, but one study found that it does have benefits.129 
Victims see a reduction in post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms.130 And 
 
 125 Kozinski’s Favorite Flicks. This is a regular event where members of the Ninth Circuit community are 
invited to see a film selected by Chief Judge Kozinski.  
 126 FACE TO FACE (MouseTrap Films 2011). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Paul Tullis, Forgiven, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 6, 2013, at 28, 32. 
 129 See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN & HEATHER STRANG, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THE EVIDENCE 4 (2007). 
 130 Id. 
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perhaps most importantly, when restorative justice is offered to arrestees, more 
offenses are brought to justice.131 
But is there a limit to the type of crime that can be dealt with through 
restorative justice? Let me tell you a recent story that comes from the Florida 
Panhandle.132 Conor and Ann had been dating for three years.133 Her parents 
thought that Conor was going to be the father of their grandchildren. So it’s not 
surprising that when Ann’s mother got word that her daughter had been shot, 
her first thought was to ask whether Conor was with her. He was indeed. It was 
the culmination of a nearly two-day fight. Ann was on her knees pleading, 
“No, don’t,” when Conor pulled the trigger.134 
After Conor had been arrested and charged with first-degree murder, Ann’s 
parents said they didn’t want Conor to spend his life in prison and began 
looking for an alternative path.135 Eventually, together with Conor’s parents, 
they contacted Sujatha Baliga, who runs a restorative justice program.136 
Baliga said restorative justice would never work in Florida, at least not for a 
homicide.137 “We do burglaries, robberies,” Baliga said.138 “There’s never been 
a murder case that’s gone through restorative justice.”139 Nonetheless, Ann’s 
parents persisted and eventually organized a pre-plea conference—a meeting 
where everything is off the record and anyone can attend.140 
At the meeting, Ann’s parents spoke first and related how Ann’s death had 
affected them.141 In the words of the prosecutor, “It was excruciating to listen 
to them talk . . . . It was as traumatic as anything I’ve ever listened to in my 
life.”142 
Then Conor spoke about what had happened, how he and Ann had started 
fighting and how he’d wanted to scare Ann with the gun so they’d stop 
fighting.143 
 
 131 Id.  
 132 See Tullis, supra note 128, at 30. 
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At the conclusion of the conference, everyone gave their recommended 
sentence. Ann’s mom said five to fifteen years. Ann’s father, ten to fifteen. 
Conor’s parents agreed with ten to fifteen years. And “Conor said he didn’t 
think he should have a say” in the matter.144 
The prosecutor refused to come up with a figure, and with that the 
conference was over. Ann’s parents were devastated and feared that all their 
work had been for naught. But after some time, the prosecutor came around 
and offered Conor twenty years in prison plus probation, which Conor 
accepted.145 
While Conor’s story isn’t a complete privatization of criminal justice, it’s 
an illustration that private justice can work. Ninth Circuit mediators have even 
managed to resolve capital cases.146 
Restorative justice offers a number of benefits. It saves court resources, 
which is good for taxpayers.147 The defendant may get a better plea deal than if 
his sentence were up to the prosecutor alone.148 And it allows the victims to be 
hands-on participants instead of helpless bystanders. 149 
Nonetheless, the effects on equality and accountability could be serious. 
First, the system doesn’t work with all crimes. For example, what do we do 
with victimless crimes?150 It’s hard to imagine what a restorative justice 
meeting would look like where the defendant was accused of drug possession, 
hunting bald eagles, or being in the United States illegally. 
More importantly, restorative justice makes equalizing sentences among 
criminals more difficult. Certain segments of society (Wall Street bankers) are 
more likely to go through restorative justice than others (gang members). And 
this will exacerbate inequalities already present in the criminal justice 
system.151 
 
 144 Id. at 35. 
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 148 See id. at 23. 
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 151 See generally BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 1–8 (2006) (discussing 
the prison boom from 1970 to 2003 and its effects on racial inequality). 
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Accountability is also a problem in this system. By diverting criminals to 
restorative justice, society loses some ability to hold them accountable. 
Although Conor went to prison, Florida lost something in the process. There 
was no public trial, and no jury decided on guilt or punishment. Instead, a deal 
was struck in private with only the victim’s parents, the perpetrator and his 
family, and the prosecutor participating. Then again, the process was no less 
public than an ordinary plea bargain, which is how most criminal cases are 
resolved these days.152 
*       *       * 
No question about it, privatization has benefits: competition, specialization, 
and efficiency among them. But privatization of government functions also 
raises a number of serious challenges, some of which we’ve tried to illustrate 
by reference to various examples. To summarize, these challenges are: 
1. The difficulty of maintaining accountability when those affected by the 
activity, positively or negatively, have no economic control because the 
contractor is compensated by taxpayer dollars. 
2. The risk that the incentives or disincentives of private contractors will 
not align with the interests of the public, and the private contractors will 
therefore undermine the focus of the governmental mission. 
3. The disadvantages and benefits of allowing some people to opt out of 
governmental services by buying their way out of the system, leaving other 
(usually poorer) participants to rely on what may be second-rate public 
services. 
4. The problem of governmental immunity as applied to government 
contractors who perform public functions. 
5. The risk that some activities that are public in character will be made 
private and disappear from public scrutiny. 
These problems aren’t intractable. At least we hope they’re not. By 
remembering to protect the essence of public institutions, we can develop 
systems that not only reap the rewards of the open market but also preserve the 
equality and accountability that these institutions require. Emory Law 
 
 152 See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer 
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (2011) (“From the 1970s through the early 2000s, plea bargains 
resolved the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States.”). 
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Journal’s symposium is an important step toward meeting these challenges, 
and the contributions made by the distinguished panelists will serve to better 
equip all of us as we move toward more and more privatization. 
